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Abstract 
This study addresses the central question in political economy how the objectives of attaining 
welfare and restricting income inequality are related to each other. Thus far few studies scru-
tinise whether income inequality as such, or the redistributing public interventions to equalise 
incomes affect economic growth. This study aims to fill this gap using a panel design covering 
30 OECD countries. Taking into account the limited data availability, this study finds a nega-
tive association between redistribution and growth that remains significant when the level of 
inequality is held constant. No evidence is found for a relationship between income inequality 
and growth. This finding is in line with the trade-off hypothesis, holding that redistribution 
limits the financial incentives to gain wealth, leading to lower output growth. Yet, the found 
association is small, and a causal interpretation of the negative association between redistri-
bution and growth does not seem to be warranted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The attainment of welfare and growth and the restraining of income inequality, particularly by 
means of decreasing poverty, are amongst the most important socio-economic objectives of 
welfare states. Economic expansion implies a higher aggregate standard of living and more 
utility-enhancing consumption possibilities for the society as a whole. The goal of limiting in-
come inequality pertains more to ideological concepts of fairness, humanitarianism, and 
equality of human beings. Rawls (1971), for example, argues that societies should have ‘fair 
equality of opportunities’, enabling every citizen to pursue personal goals, not limited before-
hand by financial constraints. In addition, the objective of limiting inequality can be linked to 
the provision of a certain level of income security guaranteed by the state.  
The question what the core objectives of society should be is largely ideological. Con-
versely, how the objectives of economic growth and limited income inequality can be reached 
is a more technical question, although not less contested in academic and political debates. 
The crux here is whether states are able to limit income inequality whilst at the same time 
stimulate economic growth through their policies – or the very absence of them. In order to 
attain high economic growth policies should not have too high costs in terms of foregone out-
put, and the (financing of) public expenditures should not negatively affect incentives benefi-
cial to growth (OECD 2012). Limiting income inequality requires that state actions benefit the 
poor relatively more in the long run.  
Affluent states play an important role in alleviating inequality by redistributing income 
(Brady 2003). The general view in economics, however, is that redistribution based on eco-
nomic outcomes, for instance on gained capital or income, reduces marginal benefits of gain-
ing wealth, leading to lower incentives, which retards growth. Okun (1975) coins this the ‘big 
trade-off’, as this negative effect of redistribution on the attainment of welfare ‘[…] plagues us 
in dozens of dimensions of social policy’. The alleged trade-off is considered to be the primary 
problem for the contemporary welfare state by many politicians and applied researchers 
(Pierson and Castles 2006; Sapir 2006). Pontusson (2005) calls the ‘market-liberal view’ of a 
trade-off between efficiency and equality the ‘economic orthodoxy of our times’.  
Another substantial branch of mostly political economy literature has focused on the 
effects of income inequality on economic development. Inequality can affect growth for in-
stance by leading to more social unrest, or by inhibiting people lacking financial means to 
invest in themselves to realise their potential. According to Benabou (1996) – although one 
can hold different views, as will be discussed in the second section – the empirical findings 
‘[…] run over a variety of data sets and periods with many different measures of income dis-
tribution, deliver a consistent message: initial inequality is detrimental to long-run growth’.  
We might thus expect an effect from the income distribution as well as from the poli-
cies put in place to equalise incomes on economic growth. Yet, surprisingly, few studies pay 
attention to both of these effects. In the substantial amount of literature on the effects of 
income inequality on growth, hardly any study controls for effects through the redistributive 
system (e.g., Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa 1999; Banerjee and Duflo 2003; Barro 
2008). In fact, even in a number of inequality databases, including the often used Deininger 
and Squire database (1996), no consistent distinction is made between the income distribu-
tion before and after government intervention through taxes and transfers (Banerjee and Du-
flo 2003: 284). On their turn, studies investigating effects of redistribution in general do not 
take into account possible effects of income inequality (e.g., Romer and Romer 2010). When 
inequality is indeed ‘detrimental to long-run growth’ as Benabou concludes, redistribution 
might have less negative effects than we should expect solely from trade-off arguments, 
whilst we might even underestimate negative effects when inequality stimulates growth.  
This study investigates the associations between economic growth on the one hand, 
and inequality and redistribution on the other. Many scholars consider the relationship be-
tween redistribution and growth to be the primary problem for the contemporary welfare state 
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(Pierson and Castles 2006; Sapir 2006). It can also be seen as the question in which political 
science, generally occupied with questions related to distribution and redistribution of power 
and income, and economics, in which economic growth plays a central role, collide (Lübker 
2007). A number of hypotheses are derived why income inequality and redistribution can af-
fect growth. Employing a panel design of 25 to 30 OECD countries, this study does not find 
any obvious association between income inequality and economic growth, using multiple ine-
quality indicators derived from a high-quality OECD database. Yet, there is empirical evidence 
that redistribution is associated with lower GDP growth, although the association does not 
appear to be particularly strong. This result remains firm when the level of inequality is held 
constant. This finding is in line with the trade-off hypothesis, holding that redistribution limits 
the financial incentives to gain wealth which leads to lower output growth, although a causal 
interpretation does not seem to be warranted.  
 
2. Theoretical section 
 
This section sets out theoretical reasons why income inequality and redistribution might affect 
economic growth in developed countries. An overview of empirical literature can be found in 
the Appendix.  
 
2.1 Inequality and growth 
Four main channels through which inequality can affect economic growth can be discerned in 
the existing literature.  
Two lines of reasoning predict a positive effect of income inequality on economic 
growth. First, higher dispersion can incite people to put forth additional effort, as the rewards 
of this additional effort are higher compared to the situation in an egalitarian society. From 
experimental economics there is evidence that relative incomes are important for perceived 
welfare or well-being (Gruen and Klasen 2008). Rooth and Stenberg (2011) provide explor-
ative evidence that income inequality in Swedish regions were found to increase economic 
growth by stimulating commuting patterns. Within firms, a higher wage dispersion can en-
hance productivity (Mahy, Rycx and Volral 2011). This channel predicts effects of income ine-
quality regardless of the level of wealth, as long as people are (linearly) inclined to gain more 
wealth.  
A second reason why income inequality might positively affect growth comes from the 
alleged positive effects of inequality on savings. If high income classes have higher marginal 
propensities to save, and if the rates of savings and investment are positively related, more 
unequal societies will have a higher steady-state growth rate (Castelló-Climent 2010; Kaldor 
1957). It could also be that a concentration of capital is crucial for the construction of new 
activities with high set-up costs (Galor and Tsiddon 1997). In this way, a more unequal soci-
ety will have a higher output growth than the more equal one with the same wealth level. Yet, 
a more unequal society is only beneficial to growth when low income classes have no or a 
lower propensity to save – an overall higher wealth level so that more people can save would 
stimulate growth as well. Possibly, because of the internationalisation of the capital market, 
the relationship between inequality and savings has weakened. Firms in countries with lower 
saving rates can rely on the savings available in other countries to finance their investments. 
Two reasons are commonly put forward why inequality can slow down growth. More 
unequal societies might well be less socio-politically stable as inequality lowers costs of par-
ticipating in disruptive actions. Unequal countries experience more violent protests, ethnic 
tensions, and social polarisation, which can reduce the security of property and contract rights 
and, ultimately, discourage investment and reduce economic output (Keefer and Knack 2002). 
These factors may play a less important role in developed countries as property rights are 
relatively well-secured (Barro 2008). More directly, participation in disruptive events is a 
waste of resources as time and energy is not spent on productive events (Barro 2000). One 
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could expect that a very unequal distribution of wealth increases possibilities of social tensions 
regardless of the level of wealth, although instability especially is likely to be especially an 
issue when the poverty rate is high.  
A second channel pertains to the alleged negative effects of inequality on the stock of 
human capital. Credit market imperfections inhibit people lacking financial means to fully real-
ise their potential, dampening investment in human capital and overall knowledge building, 
thereby reducing economic output. This line of reasoning predicts a negative effect of income 
inequality on economic growth by decreasing the stock of human capital. As the economic 
importance of schooling has increased in current knowledge-based economies, this negative 
effect of inequality through the human capital channel might have become more imperative 
(Galor and Moav 2004). The credit market imperfections theory predicts an effect of a lack of 
financial means rather than overall income dispersion on growth. In the situation that every-
one has enough wealth to invest in their education, the negative effects of income inequality 
on growth should disappear. It therefore is more appropriate to test this theory using an indi-
cator that focuses on the inequality in the lower part of the distribution.  
 
A difficulty in understanding the consequences of inequality on growth is the possibility of 
reverse effects. Unless all people benefit equiproportionally, growth itself also affects the in-
come distribution. There is discussion whether growth mainly benefits the rich or whether it 
‘trickles down’ and equalises incomes (Bruno, Ravallion and Squire 1998). Growth might 
benefit the poor by leading to higher tax revenues and higher demands for goods produced by 
low-income groups (Dollar and Kraay 2002). Famously, Kuznets (Barro 2008; Kuznets 1955) 
argues that the long-term effect of growth on inequality shows an inverted U-shape pattern. 
During initial phases of development only part of the labour moves towards modern sectors, 
leading to a higher wage dispersion, whilst the rest lags behind. Eventually more and more 
people become active in this modern sector, leading to a catch up and a more equalised dis-
tribution. In this sense, economic growth is the forerunner of income equality.  
 
2.2 Redistribution and growth 
Not only the level of inequality might affect growth, but also the policies put in place to equal-
ise incomes through means-tested transfers, progressive taxing to finance public expendi-
tures, and institutions such as a minimum wage (Goudswaard and Caminada 2010). A num-
ber of theories have been constructed to predict the effects of income redistribution on eco-
nomic growth. 
According to the well-known trade-off argument the alteration of market outcomes by 
public redistribution incites people to change their behaviour by reducing financial incentives 
to gain individual wealth, leading to a lower overall economic output (Allegrezza, Heinrich and 
Jesuit 2004). With lower marginal returns to work, substitution to leisure becomes more at-
tractive. A related argument is that public provision, e.g., in the form of unemployment bene-
fits, can make people dependent on government support. The very creation of unemployment 
benefits might lead to higher unemployment rates, as people are less inclined to seek jobs 
(Kenworthy 2003).  
Empirical evidence for the trade-off hypothesis on macro level is more mixed, see also 
the empirical literature overview in the Appendix. Romer and Romer (2010) present macro-
economic evidence for ‘exogenous tax changes’ in the US, which are fiscal changes imple-
mented to influence long-term growth rather than short-term countercyclical reactions, using 
a VAR model. They estimate that a 1 per cent increase in exogenous tax lowers growth with 
2.5 per cent permanently. Conversely, Lindert (2004) stresses that the welfare state is a free 
lunch. He shows that growth patterns of states that strongly redistribute wealth, for instance 
in Sweden, have not been surpassed by economic growth in more liberal states such as the 
US or the UK. According to Lindert generous welfare states have come up with strategies to 
minimise behavioural changes, most notably by universal provision instead of means testing, 
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and by relying on taxes for which elasticities are relatively low. In addition, as Lindert de-
notes, it is likely that people that are already less motivated or less productive drop out first, 
leading to minimal welfare effects. According to Kenworthy (2003) the negative effects of 
public intervention on employment also prove better than expected from the trade-off argu-
ment. He only reports a weak negative effect of higher replacement rates on employment.  
Other arguments focus on the alleged lower effectiveness of public allocation of re-
courses. Reallocation increases transaction costs, as aptly captured by Okun’s (1975) meta-
phor of a leaky bucket: ‘The money must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky 
bucket. Some of it will simply disappear in the transit, the poor will not receive all the money 
that is taken from the rich’.  
 Public policies that potentially have redistributing effects may facilitate growth by pub-
licly providing for insurances against risks such as unemployment, disabilities, and old age 
that markets cannot (efficiently) provide for (Boadway and Keen 2000). In addition, the exis-
tence of a safety net might also make people less risk-averse and more innovative which 
might be beneficial to economic growth. Lastly, redistribution might stimulate growth by de-
creasing income inequality, which is further discussed in sub section 2.3. 
 
Yet, there might also be a reverse effect in the situation that economic growth influences the 
need and demand for redistribution. Growth shapes possibilities for public policies. In case of 
a positive income elasticity of demand for social spending, a richer country will be more will-
ing to publicly purchase insurances against unemployment, sickness, or on pensions, com-
monly referred to as Wagner’s law (Meltzer and Richard 1983). Second, in a system with 
automatic stabilisers, greater inequality because of economic turmoil leads to more redistribu-
tion by default (Immervoll and Richardson 2011). In addition, countries can implement short-
term policies to respond to economic downturns, which are generally designed to stimulate 
employment and in this way affect redistributive levels (Chung and Thewissen 2011).  
 
2.3 Combining the lines of reasoning 
Figure 1 schematically displays the arguments discussed in sub sections 2.1 and 2.2 why we 
might expect effects of income inequality and redistribution, in some way isolated from each 
other, on economic growth. Yet, there are also likely to be direct links between redistribution 
and income inequality. All current welfare states decrease income inequality through redistri-
bution, at least in the short run (Immervoll and Richardson 2011). This implies that the ‘total’ 
effect of redistribution on growth consists of a direct effect of redistribution on growth, and an 
effect on growth by alleviating income inequalities. For instance, in the scenario that both 
income inequality and redistribution have a direct negative effect on growth, the total effect of 
redistribution on economic growth will be less negative or even positive, as it also decreases 
harmful inequality. Thus, when inequality hampers growth, redistribution can be seen as a 
social investment – so that ‘[…] the welfare state can be an irrigation system which supports 
economic efficiency and growth’ (Korpi 1985) – albeit with possible costs on its own.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the hypotheses 
 
Economic growth 
 
     
Inequality before taxes and transfers 
Trade-off, transaction          Physical and human capital  
   costs, insurances         Redistribution          investment, stability, incentives 
 
Inequality after taxes and transfers 
 
There might also run a causal relationship from inequality to redistribution by influencing 
preferences for redistribution (Finseraas 2010; Lübker 2007). Most of this literature employs 
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median voter models, in which each potential voter has equal weight and in which voting 
preferences are determined by income. Based on these assumptions it can be derived that the 
majority will favour distorting redistribution when the (gross) mean income exceeds the 
(gross) median income (Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Lübker 2007). The more dispersed the 
wealth, the lower the wealth of the median voter relative to the mean income, which will in-
crease the level of redistribution. Yet, the empirical literature on the effects of inequality on 
the amount of redistribution is quite inconclusive. Kenworthy and McCall (2008) do not find 
any evidence for a positive effect of inequality before taxes and transfers on the level of redis-
tribution, tracking eight countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Lübker (2007) also does not 
find evidence that public support for redistribution rises with inequality across countries. Due 
to these empirical problems, Karabarbounis (2010) and Lupu and Pontusson (2011) present 
further refinements of the median voter model, taking into account the income level of the 
different income groups relative to the mean and the distance between the incomes of those 
groups.  
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also make use of political economy arguments, but they 
predict a nonlinear relationship between inequality and growth, concluding that ‘[…] growth 
rate is an inverted U-shape function of net changes in inequality’. According to them, changes 
in inequality in any direction are associated with lower growth. Based on a political economy 
model, they argue that ‘planned changes in inequality’ or ‘hold-ups’ are more common in 
situations of extreme equality and extreme inequality. In addition, in the case that measure-
ment errors in inequality data are higher during times of economic turmoil, changes in ine-
quality will be associated with lower growth rates.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Estimation methods 
The inequality to growth literature from the 1990s generally connects a country’s income dis-
tribution at the beginning of a long time period, usually around thirty years, to the average 
growth rate during that period (Perotti 1996; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Rodrik and Alesina 
1994). The regressions are estimated by OLS. By and large, the estimations report negative 
associations, leaving Benabou (1996) to argue that ‘[t]hese regressions, run over a variety of 
data sets and periods with many different measures of income distribution, deliver a consis-
tent message: initial inequality is detrimental to long-run growth’.  
 Yet, OLS yields biased estimates when unobserved time invariant country effects are 
correlated with the included explanatory variables. In growth equations there are likely to be 
many unobserved variables, as economic growth is ultimately the final outcome of innumer-
able market economy transactions (Sala-I-Martin 1997). Persistent differences in adopted 
technological levels, cultures and institutions might well affect the growth rate as well as the 
level of inequality. Therefore, later studies turn to panel data to examine how changes in in-
come distribution affected the growth rate in the subsequent five or ten year period, mostly 
by using fixed effects estimation (Arjona, Ladaique and Pearson 2002; Castelló-Climent 2004; 
Forbes 2000). Generally, the negative coefficient disappears – Forbes even reports a signifi-
cant positive association. 
 Even though fixed effects estimation is unaffected by heterogeneity bias, it is more 
sensitive to measurement error than OLS for relatively time invariant stock variables. Monte 
Carlo studies indicate underestimation of the effects of physical and human capital in growth 
regressions (Hauk and Wacziarg 2009). As the levels of income inequality and redistribution 
are also relatively stable over time, fixed effects estimation might underreport those factors 
as well. A number of authors cope with these problems by using 3SLS (Barro 1999) or Sys-
tem-GMM (Castelló-Climent 2004). Yet, GMM has disadvantages as well. The procedure of 
first-differencing and using lags as instruments involves a loss of at least three periods of 
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data. In addition, its first-differenced nature does not allow for inclusion of the level of income 
as a control variable to account for conditional convergence (see sub section 3.3).  
 
3.2 Inequality and redistribution indicators 
An important concern in research on inequality is the availability and quality of data, espe-
cially for the income distribution before taxes and transfers. The larger income inequality da-
tabases that include observations for developing countries suffer from measurement error, 
low comparability between countries, and heterogeneity in survey design (Atkinson and Bran-
dolini 2001). Many studies, as can be seen in the Appendix, rely on the Deininger and Squire 
income distribution database (1996). Unfortunately, this database does not consistently dis-
tinguish between the income distribution before and after taxes and transfers (Banerjee and 
Duflo 2003: 284).  
This study uses the OECD database on income distribution and poverty, which contains 
comparable country level data based on similar definitions and equivalence scales (OECD 
2008). At most four continuous decades of data per country are available (1970-1979, 1980-
1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009). Data are available for 30 OECD member states.1 The panel is 
unbalanced mainly due to missing observations for Eastern European countries. The database 
includes data for multiple distribution indicators after taxes and transfers, both for entire and 
working age population. For distribution before taxes and transfers, only the Gini for the en-
tire population has a sufficient number of observations. As noted in the theoretical section, a 
number of theories predict effects of inequality in the lower part of the income distribution. 
For this the percentage of the population with an income below 50 per cent of the current 
median income is used, as too few observations are available at other thresholds. This vari-
able is referred to as the poverty rate. Box 1 summarises the characteristics of the indicators. 
 
 
Box 1. Inequality indicators 
 
Income is adjusted to household size, assuming an equivalence scale of 0.5 (OECD 2008). For all inequality 
indicators a lower number indicates a more equal income distribution.  
 Gini coefficient: the ratio of the area between a 45 degrees line and the proportion of total national 
income cumulatively earned from lowest to highest incomes. It varies between 0 and 100, where 0 
indicates that everyone enjoys the same income, whilst 100 pertains to one person earning all;  
 Mean log deviation (MLD): average log deviation between the mean and disposable income of each 
household member. Complete equality yields 0, whereas its maximum is (1+ln(100))ln(mean);  
 Squared coefficient of variation (SCV): squared ratio from the standard deviation to its mean per 
equivalent household member. Its minimum is 0, its maximum is infinity; 
 Poverty rate: the percentage households with an income below 50 per cent of the current median 
income. 
 
Redistribution is measured both in an absolute and relative manner. Absolute redistribution is 
calculated as the difference between the Gini before and after taxes and transfers for the en-
tire population. Relative redistribution is defined as the absolute redistribution divided by the 
Gini before taxes and transfers for the entire population. Due to the low number of observa-
tions for inequality before taxes and transfers, only 60 observations are available for the re-
distribution indicators.  
 Following the literature, the inequality and redistribution indicators are put in natural 
logarithm. As economic growth is also expressed as natural logarithm (see next sub section), 
the coefficients should be interpreted as elasticities.  
 
                                                 
1 Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland 
(FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), 
Japan (JPN), South Korea (KOR), Luxembourg (LUX), Mexico (MEX), the Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand 
(NZL), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Swit-
zerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR), and the United States (USA).  
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3.3 The MRW framework 
Three specifications are widely used in the macroeconomic literature on the relationship be-
tween income inequality and economic growth (Barro 2000; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992; 
Perotti 1996). The Perotti framework excludes most variables through which the effect of ine-
quality on growth might be channelled, such as the level of investment. The Barro specifica-
tion, on the other hand, includes terms of trade, government consumption, education, in-
vestment share, and a number of variables tailored towards developing countries (fertility, 
indices of rule of law and democracy, and colonial history).  
The Mankiw et al. framework (MRW), designed to explain convergence between coun-
tries, is an adequate compromise between the two frameworks. The design was originally 
constructed to estimate the rate of income convergence between countries, but is also often 
used in the inequality to growth literature (Arjona, Ladaique and Pearson 2002; Rooth and 
Stenberg 2011; Voitchovsky 2005). Real GDP growth per person is regressed on the level of 
real GDP, population growth, and the stocks of human and physical capital. Due to conver-
gence, the initial level of income is thought to have a negative effect on subsequent growth. 
The same holds for population growth, as ‘[…] high population growth lowers income per cap-
ita because the amounts of both physical and human capital must be spread more thinly over 
the population’ (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). The stocks of physical and human capital are 
expected to have positive effects on subsequent economic growth. Yet, these last two vari-
ables are also channels through which inequality or redistribution might affect growth, as dis-
cussed in the theoretical section. Therefore, the empirical analyses are conducted both with 
and without the stock of physical and human capital.  
The MRW framework can be written in the following way as a fixed effects model, with 
yit as the level of real GDP per person for country i at time t, xit as the vector of the other con-
trol variables, git as the independent variable of interest, that is, inequality, redistribution, or 
both, and a set of ai country and ηt time dummies, with idiosyncratic error term uit, clustered 
on country level to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity: 
 
(ln(yit+9) – ln(yit+1))/8 = β1 ln(yit) + γ ln(git) + ln(xit)β + uit + ai + ηt  (1) 
 
To prevent endogeneity problems, economic growth is measured as the difference between 
the level of welfare at the end of the period and at the beginning of the period plus one year, 
as the level of welfare at the beginning of period is already present as an explanatory vari-
able. As ten year periods are taken, excluding the first year of growth, the growth rate is di-
vided by 8 to end up with having an average annual growth rate.2  
As Islam (1995) remarks, the β1 coefficient in a fixed effects framework cannot be in-
terpreted as the convergence rate in a ‘classic’ sense, that is, the rate in which countries ap-
proach the same welfare level. This is so because in the panel specification the level of income 
differs per period and country, instead of being held constant at the beginning of the period.  
 Two baseline equations are formulated. When the income distribution indicator refers 
to the entire population, economic growth, level of income, and population growth also are 
expressed per capita. For the indicators focusing on working age population, the growth 
model variables are expressed per working age person as well. As is common in growth litera-
ture, all variables are expressed in natural logarithm (Islam 1995).  
 Economic growth and level of income are expressed as real GDP growth per person, 
2000 PPP in US dollars. Population growth is defined as the growth of the total population 
between 15-64 at the beginning of the period. The stock of physical capital is measured as 
the average annual total gross fixed capital formulation in percentage of real GDP; for the 
                                                 
2 For the period 1979-1970 for instance, economic growth is measured as the difference in log welfare per per-
son in 1979 and 1971, whilst initial level of income is defined as log welfare per person in 1970. Other ways of 
dealing with this essentially lagged dependent variable endogeneity, such as Chamberlain’s Π-matrix or GMM, 
require more data points (see Dowrick, S., and M. Rogers. 2002. "Classical and technological convergence: 
beyond the Solow-Swan growth model." Oxford Economic Papers 54(3):369-85.).  
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stock of human capital the average years of total schooling for the total population aged 25 
and over is used. All data come from OECD National Accounts and Economic Outlook no. 88, 
except for the human capital indicator (Barro and Lee 2010). 
 
4. Empirical analyses 
 
4.1 Data description and trends 
The inequality indicators reveal a moderate trend towards increasing income inequality within 
the OECD area, as documented elsewhere and graphically displayed here in Figure 2 (OECD 
2008; OECD 2011). In the data set used here, the average Gini after taxes and transfers for 
the entire population increased from 29.4 to 31.1 between 1975 and 2005, which is the same 
rise reported in OECD (2008). For the seven countries for which data are available for all peri-
ods, the average Gini rose from 28.6 to 30.4. Spain, France, and Greece are the only coun-
tries with a decrease in inequality over time. The Scandinavian countries report the lowest 
inequality after taxes and transfers levels, whilst high values are reported in Mexico, Turkey, 
and to a lesser extent in Southern European countries, the US, and the UK.  
 The poverty rate after taxes and transfers shows a more stable pattern, where highest 
average values are reported in the first period. On average, poverty has increased in the last 
period compared to the second and third one. Highest poverty rates after taxes and transfers 
are reported in Mexico (although decreasing), Turkey, and the US (and increasing). 
 
Figure 2. Gradual and widespread rise in income inequality within the OECD area 
 
Gini after taxes and transfers, entire population            Poverty rate after taxes and transfers, 50 threshold 
19
24
29
34
39
1975 1985 1995 2005
0
5
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20
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Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
The Gini before taxes and transfers for the entire population has an even stronger increase 
over time between 1975 and 2005 (from 38.9 to 45.0 for all countries, from 37.7 to 43.4 for 
the six countries without missing values). In general, the income distribution before taxes and 
transfers shows less variation between countries. Its standard deviation of 5.4 is roughly 
twenty per cent lower than its counterpart after taxes and transfers. This implies that the 
distribution of market outcomes are more similar across countries than the income distribu-
tion after public intervention, pointing to an important impact of the welfare state on the in-
come distribution. Italy, Poland, Portugal, but also Germany show high levels of inequality 
before redistribution, although this is probably partly due to the lack of data for Turkey and 
Mexico. Again, the Scandinavian countries show the most equal income distributions.  
 The poverty rate before taxes and transfers shows a pattern comparable to the Gini, 
before taxes and transfers. It increases quite strongly over time (from 21.1 to 25.5 for all, 
and from 22.1 to 26.5 for the five countries without missing values). Spain, Finland, and 
South Korea show the lowest poverty rates before taxes and transfers (around 18 in 2005). 
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As was the case for the inequality before taxes and transfers, high values are reported in It-
aly, Poland, but also Belgium and Germany. The most rapid increase in poverty before taxes 
took place in Japan (from 12.5 to 26.9 between 1985 and 2005).  
 
The level of absolute income redistribution has increased over time (from 11.1 to 15.0 for all 
countries and from 11.2 to 13.2 for the six countries without missing values), although the 
highest values are reported in 1995, as can be seen in Figure 3. Sweden and continental 
Europe have high redistributive values (around 20); whilst Norway and Finland redistribute 
less income (between 11 and 16). South Korea and the US have the least redistributive wel-
fare states. Figure also 3 shows that the amount of relative income redistribution, which is the 
amount of absolute redistribution divided by the Gini before taxes and transfers, follows a 
comparable pattern over time. Again, Sweden has the highest values, whereas less income is 
redistributed in the US.3  
 
Figure 3. Large variation in amount of redistribution between the OECD area 
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Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
4.2 Associations between inequality and growth 
As noted previously, OLS estimations usually produce statistically significant negative effects 
of inequality on growth (Perotti 1996; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Rodrik and Alesina 1994). 
Simple associations between changes in income distribution or the poverty rate and changes 
in economic growth summarised in Figure 4 reveal an inconclusive picture here. The trend 
lines in Figure 4 show a low R-squared value. 
                                                 
3 The amount of poverty reduction, defined as the difference between the poverty rate before and after taxes 
and transfers at 50 per cent of the current median income, has a pattern equivalent to the development of 
income redistribution over time. It shows an increasing trend over time (from 9.4 to 16.2 for all countries, and 
from 9.1 to 14.7 for the six countries without missing values), with highest values reported in 1995.  
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Figure 4. No clear association between trends in inequality, poverty, and economic growth 
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Note: Indicators defined as changes between log values at fourth and second period; fourth and third period 
for CZE, HUN, and POL. Economic growth: real GDP per capita. Wage dispersion: Gini after taxes and 
transfers, entire population. Poverty rate: poverty rate after taxes and transfers, 50 per cent of current 
median income. For inequality CHE, and for poverty AUS, GBR, NLD, and PRT are calculated as the dif-
ference between fourth and third period.  
Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
Nevertheless, OLS results are biased in the presence of heterogeneity bias. Tests indicate that 
there are indeed significant correlations between country effects and the explanatory vari-
ables. Therefore, Table 1 presents fixed effects panel estimation results which control for un-
observed heterogeneity.  
 
Table 1. No clear association between inequality after taxes and transfers and economic 
growth  
Dependent variable: log real GDP growth per capita (columns 2-4), per working age person (columns 5-7) 
Entire population Working age population  Baseline 
 
 
 
(1) 
Gini 
 
 
(2) 
Squared 
coefficient 
of variation 
(3) 
Mean log 
deviation 
 
(4) 
Gini 
 
 
(5) 
Squared 
coefficient 
of variation 
 (6) 
Mean log 
deviation 
 
 (7) 
Inequality 
measure 
 
.006 
(.017) 
.003 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.014) 
.001 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.008) 
Level of 
income 
-.059 
(.014) *** 
-.059 
(.014) *** 
-.050 
(.017) *** 
-.052 
(.017) *** 
-.063 
(.010) *** 
-.060 
(.014) *** 
-.061 
(.012) *** 
Population 
growth 
-.316 
(.299) 
-.312 
(.301) 
-.557 
(.393) 
-.599 
(.444) 
-.394 
(.306) 
-.330 
(.286) 
-.334 
(.323) 
Physical 
capital 
-.010 
(.014) 
-.010 
(.013) 
-.008 
(.012) 
-.009 
(.013) 
-.015 
(.009) 
-.013 
(.012) 
-.013 
(.011) 
Human 
capital 
.020 
(.009) ** 
.021 
(.009) ** 
.023 
(.009) ** 
.017 
(.010) * 
.010 
(.007) 
.010 
(.016) 
.005 
(.016) 
Constant 
.173 
(.028) *** 
.151 
(.064) ** 
.131 
(.032) *** 
.167 
(.042) *** 
.254 
(.051) *** 
.223 
(.069) *** 
.247 
(.072) *** 
Observ 80 80 71 71 78 67 67 
Countries 30 30 28 28 30 28 28 
R-squared .665 .666 .719 .714 .707 .718 .718 
F test 46.82 *** 40.28 *** 64.89 *** 64.64 *** 73.87 *** 67.45 *** 66.01 *** 
Note: Country fixed effects, 1970-2009, ten year periods with time dummies, clustered standard errors be-
tween brackets. Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per cent). 
All variables in logs. Columns 1-4: per capita sample. Columns 5-7: working age population sample. All 
inequality indicators are measured after taxes and transfers. See Box 1 for their definition.  
Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
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The results reported in Table 1 consistently indicate that inequality after taxes and transfers 
does not have a clear association with economic growth. The coefficients of the inequality 
measures are robust to the exclusion of countries.4 Exclusion of the human capital indicator 
as an explanatory variable, to allow for negative associations between inequality and growth 
through a lower stock of human knowledge, makes the inequality indicator coefficients more 
negative or less positive, but still (strongly) insignificant. The exclusion of the stock of physi-
cal capital to consider possible effects of inequality through the savings channel does not af-
fect the inequality coefficients in any systematic way.  
 
Further evidence that there is no evident relationship between income inequality and eco-
nomic growth for affluent countries comes from Table 2. Here, the Gini before taxes and 
transfers and the poverty gap before and after taxes and transfers are employed as income 
distribution indicators (columns 2-4). The results are again robust to the exclusion of coun-
tries and variables, especially when taking into account the strong influence of Italy and Japan 
due to their high inequality and poverty before taxes and transfers.5    
 
Table 2. Also no association for other distribution indicators and specifications 
Dependent variable: log real GDP growth per capita 
 Baseline 
 
 
 
(1) 
Gini before 
taxes and 
transfers 
 
(2) 
Poverty rate 
before taxes 
and transfers 
 
(3) 
Poverty rate 
after taxes 
and transfers 
 
(4) 
Squared Gini 
growth, full 
sample 
 
(5) 
Squared Gini 
growth, 
excluding 
New Zealand 
(6) 
Inequality 
measure 
 
-.023 
(.016) 
-.016 
(.011) 
.002 
(.004) 
.000 
(.000) ** 
.000 
(.000) 
Level of 
income 
-.079 
(.018) *** 
-.078 
(.018) *** 
-.091 
(.015) *** 
-.059  
(.014) *** 
-.090 
(.016) *** 
-.080 
(.016) *** 
Population 
growth 
.276 
(.144) 
.313 
(.142) ** 
-.077 
(.243)  
-.309  
(.293) 
-.456 
(.229) * 
-.829 
(.469) 
Physical 
capital 
-.011 
(.008) 
-.014 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.017)  
-.012  
(.014)  
-.004 
(.017) 
-.001 
(.017) 
Human 
capital 
.000 
(.011) 
-.005 
(.012) 
.015 
(.009) 
.023  
(.004) ** 
.039 
(.019) * 
.031 
(.018) 
Constant 
.264 
(.051) *** 
.363 
(.086) *** 
.297 
(.092) *** 
.166  
(.028) *** 
.204 
(.056) *** 
.189 
(.059) *** 
Observ 60 60 65 76 52 50 
Countries 25 25 29 30 25 24 
R-squared .879 .892 .800 .670 .836 .858 
F test 115.6 *** 146.5 *** 47.48 *** 45.25 *** 30.88 *** 39.40 *** 
Note: Country fixed effects, 1970-2009, ten year periods with time dummies, clustered standard errors be-
tween brackets. Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per cent). 
All variables in logs, except the inequality indicator in columns 5-6. Per capita sample. Gini: entire 
population. Poverty rates: 50 per cent of current median income threshold. Banerjee and Duflo equa-
tions: squared Gini growth is used as inequality measure, defined as the difference between Gini after 
taxes and transfers, entire population, at beginning and end of period squared. 
Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
                                                 
4 The exclusion of a country does not yield a significant coefficient for any inequality indicator, apart from the 
standard coefficient of variation (SCV) for the entire population. Here, excluding Greece leads to a positive 
coefficient that is borderline significant (p value of .097). Yet, excluding other countries (Canada, Japan, Mex-
ico) yields a much lower and insignificant inequality coefficient.  
5 When excluding Norway the Gini before taxes and transfers becomes significant (p value of 0.033), but this 
result is fully driven by Japan and Italy. The poverty rate before taxes and transfers becomes significant with-
out human capital (p value of 0.067), but further analysis points out that this is again due to the strong influ-
ence of Japan and Italy. The poverty rate after taxes and transfers is fully robust to dropping indicators and 
countries. Excluding the investment indicator does not affect the results in any significant way.  
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Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 present the results for the estimations of nonlinear relations be-
tween income inequality and economic growth, as proposed by Banerjee and Duflo (2003: 
267) for reasons discussed in sub section 2.3. According to them, changes in inequality in any 
direction, captured by the squared inequality growth rate, lead to lower growth. Indeed, in 
their analyses it is this squared inequality growth rate, measured as the difference between 
logs of Gini at the end and beginning of the period, that is significant. Unfortunately, the pro-
cedure of calculating (squared) changes in inequality leads to a further decrease of the avail-
able data. This would even be more so when the variable would be put in natural logarithm; a 
stable inequality over time would yield an undefined log. Therefore no log transformation is 
used for this variable.  
Nevertheless, column 5 denotes a positive significant effect of changes in inequality, 
albeit this coefficient is very low (0.0002 with a p value of 0.03). Further analysis reveals that 
this result is driven by the inclusion of New Zealand – its exclusion decreases the size of the 
coefficient by almost a factor 4, yielding an insignificant coefficient (0.00005 with a p value of 
0.52). It is likely that the (somewhat) larger country sample, which includes a number of de-
veloping countries, can explain the difference in results of this study and the results presented 
by Banerjee and Duflo.6 
 
4.3 Associations between redistribution and growth 
This sub section addresses the relationship between income redistribution and economic 
growth. Simple OLS associations reveal a negative association between changes in income 
redistribution and economic growth, as shown in Figure 5. Czech Republic is the only country 
in the right top corner of the figure, indicating positive adjustments both in income redistribu-
tion and economic growth. Two countries combine a relatively high increase in redistribution 
with a high decrease in growth, namely Italy and Japan. Absolute and relative income redis-
tribution show equivalent developments over time.  
 
Figure 5. Negative OLS association between income redistribution and economic growth 
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Note: Indicators defined as changes between log values at fourth and second period. Economic growth: real 
GDP per capita. Income redistribution: Gini, entire population. For AUS, CZE, and PRT the difference 
between fourth and third period is used.  
Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
                                                 
6 Other differences – a slightly different set of control variables which includes fertility, government consump-
tion, and a number of dummies related to developing countries, and the use of a random effects estimator – 
cannot explain the differences, as further inspection (results not shown here) reveals. 
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The panel estimations, reported in Table 3, provide more insight, although the number of ob-
servations are low due to limited data availability. The analysis indicates a consistently nega-
tive significant association between income redistribution and economic growth. The magni-
tude and significance of the coefficient does not differ much for absolute or relative income 
redistribution.7 This indicates that the reallocation of income by public interventions is associ-
ated with lower growth regardless of the initial level of inequality before redistribution.  
 Furthermore, the results do not change in any significant way when income inequality 
is included as an explanatory variable as shown in columns 3 and 5.8 The redistribution indi-
cator remains significant, as opposed to the income inequality coefficient. This also indicates 
that the significance of the income redistribution coefficient is not likely to be a consequence 
of multicollinearity between inequality and redistribution.  
 
Table 3. Income redistribution is associated with lower economic growth 
Dependent variable: log real GDP growth per capita 
Baseline Absolute redistribution Relative redistribution  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income redistribution  
-.012 
(.004) *** 
-.012 
(.004) *** 
-.016 
(.006) *** 
-.016 
(.006) ** 
Income inequality   
.008 
(.014) 
 
-.002 
(.015) 
Level of income 
-.079 
(.018) *** 
-.073 
(.017) *** 
-.074 
(.018) *** 
-.073 
(.018) *** 
-.073 
(.018) *** 
Population growth 
.276 
(.145) * 
.244 
(.112) ** 
.223 
(.129) * 
.207 
(.113) * 
.211 
(.125) 
Physical capital 
-.011 
(.008) 
-.013 
(.009) 
-.013 
(.009) 
-.012 
(.009) 
-.012 
(.009) 
Human capital 
.000 
(.011) 
-.001 
(.010) 
.002 
(.010) 
.002 
(.010) 
.002 
(.011) 
Constant 
.264 
(.051) *** 
.286 
(.059) *** 
.254 
(.014) *** 
.300 
(.059) *** 
.308 
(.097) *** 
Observ 60 60 60 60 60 
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared .879 .906 .907 .907 .907 
F test 115.6 *** 100.6 *** 82.19 *** 86.43 *** 86.46 *** 
Note: Country fixed effects, 1970-2009, ten year periods with time dummies, clustered standard errors be-
tween brackets. Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per cent). 
All variables in logs. Per capita sample. Absolute redistribution: difference Gini before and after taxes 
and transfers, entire population. Relative redistribution: absolute redistribution divided by Gini before 
taxes and transfers, entire population. Level of inequality: Gini after taxes and transfers, entire popula-
tion.  
Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
The coefficient of the redistribution indicator varies between -0.01 and -0.02 in log specifica-
tion. It implies that for a given country, an increase in income redistribution of 1 per cent 
across time is associated with an on average 0.01 per cent annual lower economic growth 
during that ten year period, holding the control variables, including the level of inequality, 
constant. This is quite a low association. For the countries without missing values, the level of 
absolute redistribution grew between 1975 and 2005 by almost 18 per cent (from 11.2 to 
                                                 
7 In addition, fixed effects regressions yield negative coefficients for absolute and relative poverty reduction 
that are significant at the 1 per cent level. The indicators are defined in the same fashion as income redistribu-
tion, using poverty rate before and after taxes and transfers, with 50 per cent of the current median income as 
threshold. The coefficients lie between -0.005 and -0.007 and remain firm when the level of poverty rate is held 
constant.  
8 Without redistribution, income inequality is not significant for the set of countries and periods used in Table 3. 
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13.2, see sub section 4.1). Thus, according to the estimates, we should expect an associated 
0.18 per cent decrease of economic growth between that same period.9  
Even though the redistribution coefficient is weak, it remains significant when coun-
tries or variables are excluded, whilst the inequality indicator never reaches significance. Fig-
ure 6 shows this for the level of absolute redistribution, holding constant the level of inequal-
ity (column 3 in Table 3). The black line in small dashes just below -0.01 shows the absolute 
redistribution coefficient for the full sample, and the light grey lines indicate the 95 per cent 
confidence interval for this coefficient. The diamond shaped markers signify the effects of 
dropping the country displayed at the bottom of the figure. As is evident from Figure 6, the 
coefficient is not significantly changed when a country is left out of the sample. All specifica-
tions remain well within the 95 per cent confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 6. Income redistribution is robustly associated with lower growth 
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Note: Per capita sample. Income redistribution: log difference Gini before and after taxes and transfers, 
entire population. See footnote 1 for country abbreviations.  
Source: OECD (2008) and own calculations (Table 3 column 3). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study addresses the central question in political economy how the socio-economic objec-
tives of attaining welfare and restricting income inequality are related to each other. From the 
literature we can derive reasons why the income distribution might affect growth, but also 
why public redistribution to equalise incomes can influence economic output. The empirical 
analyses presented here using a macro panel design of 30 OECD countries seem to suggest 
that it is not so much the level of income inequality, but rather the level of income redistribu-
tion that is associated with (lower) economic growth.  
 The empirical results indicate that all inequality indicators, both for entire and working 
age population, after and before taxes and transfers, are not associated with economic growth 
in any systematic fashion. The same holds for the poverty level before and after taxes and 
transfers. Therefore, no evidence is found both for theories predicting a positive effect of ine-
quality on growth, through the savings or incentives channel, or for theories suggesting a 
negative effect of inequality, by affecting stability or the attainment of human capital. This 
finding corresponds to other studies employing a panel design to investigate the effects of 
inequality on growth (Arjona, Ladaique and Pearson 2002; Castelló-Climent 2004; Forbes 
2000). It might be that other studies that do report effects of inequality on growth report spu-
                                                 
9 Of course, the coefficient is calculated using all the fluctuations in redistribution and economic growth in all 
four decades and all countries, controlling for country and time effects, whereas the calculation above only 
takes into account the difference in redistribution and growth between the first and last decade.  
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rious findings, as the studies generally do not control for the amount of income redistribution. 
In addition, most studies that present evidence that inequality harms long-term growth rely 
on OLS estimations that are sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity across countries.  
Income redistribution, however, has a significant negative association with economic 
growth. The coefficient does not differ much between redistribution defined in an absolute and 
a relative way. This seems to indicate that the reallocation of income by public interventions is 
associated with lower growth regardless of the initial level of inequality before public interven-
tion. The finding that it is redistribution rather than the level of income inequality that is asso-
ciated with lower growth is in line with the trade-off argument holding that public actions to 
equalise incomes come at the cost of lower output growth, although the analyses cannot offer 
any causal evidence. Yet, the found coefficient suggests only a marginal association between 
redistribution and growth, which seems to suggest that it might be a minor trade-off rather 
than a ‘big trade-off’ (Okun 1975).  
An important limitation of this study is the low number of available observations, 
which warrants caution with the interpretation of the results. It also bounds the possibility for 
other estimation methods that require more data, such as System-GMM. The fixed effects 
estimation employed here assists in controlling for unobserved country differences, but it is 
known to have low predictive power when variables are highly persistent over time, which is 
the case for the levels of income inequality and redistribution of affluent countries. It might 
thus be that the reported coefficient underestimates the ‘true’ association between redistribu-
tion and growth. An alternative to increase the number of observations is to employ a regional 
design. An extra advantage is that with this design the redistributing effects of national poli-
cies and institutions is automatically held constant across regions.  
A second limitation of the design employed here is that the results cannot offer causal 
evidence due to the possibility of reverse effects of economic growth on the need and demand 
for public interference. Future research could focus on the persistent issue to separate the two 
causal effects, for instance by exploiting an exogenous shock in redistribution, not resulting 
from a fluctuation in growth, or vice versa. Lastly, this study used an indicator of overall ab-
solute and relative redistribution. An interesting possibility for future research is to compare 
the effects of different kinds of redistributing instruments on growth, such as means-tested 
spending, progressive taxing, or a minimum wage.  
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Appendix: Empirical literature review 
 
Income inequality and economic growth 
Authors  Period, method, sample, and 
data sources  
Dependent 
 variables  
Independent variables  Results  
Banerjee 
& Duflo 
(2003)  
RE, FE, FD, Arellano-Bond, 5-
year span, different types of 
fitting prior (Kernel and quad-
ratic), Gini from Deininger & 
Squire  
Log GDP growth 
per capita in 1980 
dollars (Summers 
and Heston)  
(Lagged) inequality and (lagged) inequality 
growth (squared) 
 
Controls: Perotti (1996: log of GDP, PPPI, 
male and female education) or Barro 
(2000: log lagged GDP and GDP squared, 
lagged government consumption, secon-
dary and higher education, fertility, differ-
ence in terms of trade, lagged investments, 
number of developing dummies  
Changes in inequality in any direction as associated 
with lower future growth, non-linear relationship 
between inequality and magnitude of changes in 
inequality, and negative relationship between 
growth and inequality lagged one period. When 
using ‘normal’ linear growth equation, RE insignifi-
cant, FD, FE and A&B positive and significant,  
Barro 
(1999; 
2000)  
Departs from conditional con-
vergence framework (Barro, 
1991; 1997). Three decades 
data (1965-75, 75-85, 85-95), 
mostly own and World Bank 
data. Gini and quintile shares 
from Deininger & Squire. 3SLS 
treating country-specific error 
terms as random, arguing that 
the differencing implicit in run-
ning FE regressions exacerbates 
the biases due to measurement 
error. 
1. Average growth 
rate of real per 
capita GDP over 
per decade  
2. Average ratio of 
real investment 
(private plus pub-
lic) to real GDP per 
decade  
Controls: baseline model for both 1 and 2: 
Gov consumption/GDP  
Rule-of-law, democracy index (squared), 
inflation rate, years of schooling at begin-
ning of period, log total fertility rate, 
growth rate of terms of trade (if not begin-
ning then period averages)  
 
Only for 1:  
investment/GDP  
IV’s are actual values of schooling and 
terms-of-trade, lagged values of other ones 
Higher inequality lowers growth in poor countries 
and stimulates it in rich countries, following the 
Kuznets hypothesis.  
Barro 
(2008)  
WIID (2007) and Deininger-
Squire for inequality measures, 
1960-2000 (5 benchmark years 
for growth to ineq, 4 for reverse 
relationship), cross-country 
growth regressions, OLS, FE, 
and 3SLS.  
1. Growth  Ine-
quality (Kuznet):  
Gini coefficients, 
lowest and highest 
quintile share.  
 
2. Inequality  
Growth: annual 
growth rate of real 
log per capita GDP  
1. Growth  Inequality (Kuznet):  
Log GDP per capita (squared), dummies for 
net income/expend, individual, former 
colony, regional dummies, openness vari-
able 
 
2. Inequality  Growth:  
Conditional-convergence framework (Barro, 
1991): initial log GDP, initial life expectancy 
from age 1, human capital (initial upper-
level school attainment of males), open-
ness, interaction term of Gini and log capita 
GDP 
Growth  Inequality (Kuznet):  
There is evidence for Kuznet’s relationship (positive 
effect Gini from log per capita GDP abd negative 
effect square log per capita GDP). Regional dummies 
are strongly significant. Openness ratio has an in-
creasingly strong inequalising effect, yet it also 
stimulates growth.  
 
Inequality  Growth: Gini added to growth equation 
is significantly negative. Interaction term Gini and 
log growth is significant, thus impact of inequality on 
growth is most negative for poorest countries (even-
tually inequality is good for growth for richer coun-
tries). Ineq has also effects on other growth vari-
ables as indicated by interaction terms. Poor coun-
tries grow faster (initial GDP). Openness variable 
has a positive effect on growth.  
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Authors  Period, method, sample, and 
data sources  
Dependent  
variables  
Independent variables  Results  
Castelló-
Climent 
(2010)  
1960-2000, 102 countries 
(max), Gini and quintile human 
capital inequality from Castello & 
Domenech, Gini from WIID and 
LIS and percentile ratios. Sys-
tem-GMM  
Average annual 
growth of real GDP 
per capita  
Lagged human or income inequality 
 
Controls: time dummies, real GDP per cap-
ita, government spending and total trade in 
% GDP, inflation rate, stock of human capi-
tal  
Human capital inequality leads to lower growth 
rates, but only in developing countries.  
Income inequality leads to lower growth rates in 
developing countries and higher growth  
De La 
Croix & 
Doepke 
(2003) 
Introducing fertility, developing 
countries mostly, following 
growth equations from Barro 
(2000) and Perotti (1996).  
Periods 1960 to 1976 or 1976 to 
1992, Penn World Tables, World 
Fertility Survey and Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys on 
total fertility rates, Deininger & 
Squire (1996), Barro & Lee 
(2001), 68 countries leading to 
N of 83.  
Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM), allowing for autocorrela-
tion and different constants in 
the two periods  
Average annual 
growth rate of GDP 
per capita  
Difference in the total fertility rate between 
women with the highest and the lowest 
education level  
 
Controls: GDP per capita, the average ratio 
of investment to GDP, the average ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP, the initial 
income Gini, African dummy, initial total 
fertility rate  
 
To control for endogeneity of investment, 
government expenditure, Gini and fertility 
differentials, IVs are used: constant, initial 
GDP per capita (squared), investment and 
government spending per GDP, fertility 
(squared), Africa dummy, tropics and ac-
cess to sea variables (Sachs & Warner, 
1997)  
More theoretical approach proposing new channel 
for inequality on growth by differential fertility. 
Families with less human capital will have more 
children and invest less in education. High inequality 
leads to large fertility differentials, lower education 
investments, and therefore lower growth.  
Forbes 
(2000)  
Gini from Deininger & Squire 
(1996), World Bank STARS data 
set, Barro & Lee (1996), Penn 
World Tables, 1966-1995 (six 
five-year periods), 45 countries,  
180 observations.  
Fixed and random effects (in-
consistent due to presence 
lagged dependent variable), 
Chamberlain’s π-matrix, 
Arellano-Bond (1991)  
Average annual 
growth (growth in 
log of real GNP per 
capita)  
Identical to Perotti (1996), with inclusion of 
country and period dummies:  
 
Initial stocks of inequality (Gini), income 
(lagged dependent variable), male and 
female education (average years of school-
ing), PPPI (market distortions, proxied by 
price level of investment)  
 
Alternative specifications are tested as 
sensitivity analysis  
Inequality is always positive, significant at 5% and 
strong, no matter what panel estimation method is 
used (although FE and RE are inconsistent).  
Galor & 
Moav 
(2004) 
Purely theoretical, combining 
strands of classic approach fo-
cusing on savings, and credit 
market imperfections approach. 
   The replacement of physical capital accumulation by 
human capital accumulation as a prime engine of 
economic growth changed the qualitative impact of 
inequality on the process of development. During 
industrial revolution because of need of savings, 
inequality stimulated growth, now human capital is 
more important inequality is associated with lower 
growth due to credit market imperfections. 
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Authors  Period, method, sample, and 
data sources  
Dependent  
variables  
Independent variables  Results  
Keefer & 
Knack 
(2002)  
Deininger & Squire (1996),  
International Country Risk Guide 
for property rights, Sullivan 
(1991) on ethinic data.  
Long-run observations with 1 
observation per country (Pers-
son and Tabellini (1994) and 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ap-
proach), period 1970–92, N of 
56 or 89, OLS  
Annual growth per 
capita averaged 
over period 1970–
92  
Initial GDP per capita, mean years of edu-
cation, income and land Gini, property 
rights index  
Social polarisation reduces security of property and 
contract rights, and for that reason also growth. 
Both relations are estimated using OLS.  
When the security of property rights is controlled for 
in OLS on inequality on growth OLS regression, 
effect of inequality diminishes considerably.  
Lundberg 
& Squire 
(2003)  
Deininger & Squire data, Penn 
World Tables  
OLS (SURE), 3SLS, Keane  
& Runkle 3SLS, 38 countries, 
five year aggregated periods, 
119 observations  
  
Base models:  
1. Growth  
2. Gini 
Simultaneous as-
sessment of 
growth and Gini  
  
1. Education, government, M2/GDP (finan-
cial development), inflation,  
Sachs-Warner openness index (all instru-
mented because of endogeneity), terms-
of-trade changes, initial income, dummy 
for 1980s and 1990s (Gini later)  
2. Education, M2/GDP (financial develop-
ment), civil liberties (Gastil index), mean 
land Gini, mean land Gini * LDC (less 
developed countries) (all instrumented 
because of endogeneity) (Growth later)  
Drawing from both literature on determinants of 
inequality and of growth, authors come up with a 
simultaneous examination of variables that cause 
both growth and inequality. Education, inflation and 
distribution are correlated with both faster growth 
and lower income inequality, whereas civil liberties 
increases equality but decreases growth, and Sachs-
Warner openness index increases growth but de-
creases equality (coefficients and joint significance 
test). Estimations are on short-run changes and not 
long-run steady state consequences of policy how-
ever.  
Panizza 
(2002) 
OLS, FE, GMM-estimator, 10 and 
20 years, 1940-1980, 14 states 
of the US  
Annual growth rate 
of income per 
capita  
Log of income per capita, inequality (Gini 
or income share of third quintile), Perotti 
control set (stock of human capital, degree 
of urbanisation, age structure), time 
dummies  
Whilst pooled OLS leads to a negative and significant 
relationship, panel estimation methods mostly lead 
to negative but insignificant associations. The asso-
ciations are not robust.  
Rooth & 
Stenberg 
(2011)  
72 Swedish regions, 1990-2006  
Gini, third quintile, p90/75 and 
p50/10 (population register 
data)  
OLS, FE, System-GMM  
Average per capita 
earnings growth  
Gini, third quintile, p90/75 and p50/10. 
Controls: log per capita income, spatial 
lag, college graduates, working age frac-
tions, employment proportions  
Positive association between inequality between 
90th and 75th percentile and economic growth, 
which disappears when controlling for commuting 
patterns.  
Voitchov-
sky 
(2005)  
LIS database, System-GMM-
estimator (Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), 
5-year panel  
data growth model, 21 coun-
tries, 1975-2000  
 
Log of real GDP per 
capita  
Inequality ratios, especially 50/10 for 
bottom and 90/75 for top inequality, Gini  
 
Controls: initial average years of school-
ing, average investment rate, initial level 
of income  
Default instruments are delta investments, 
and delta average years of schooling 
lagged  
Association inequality and growth differs alongside 
the inequality distribution. Inequality at the top end 
of the distribution is positively associated with 
growth,  
whereas there is a negative association between 
inequality at the lower end of the distribution and 
growth. A single inequality indicator will not be able 
to grasp these differences.  
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Social expenditures, redistribution, taxes, and growth 
Authors  Period, method, sample, and 
data sources  
Dependent  
variables  
Independent variables  Results  
Afonso & 
Furceri 
(2010) 
1970-2004, five year periods, 
EU15 and rest of OECD, OECD 
economic outlook, Barro & Lee 
(2001), Penn World Tables, 
pooled OLS and FE, and IV for 
simultaneity (share of govern-
ment spending by lagged val-
ues, openness, country size 
(total population; and volatility 
by its lagged values, openness).  
Data detrended using HP6.25 
filter, BP filter, first differencing  
Decomposes size (in % of GDP) 
and volatility (standard devia-
tion of the cyclical component of 
the variables)  
Growth rate of real 
GDP per capita  
1. Government revenue in % of GDP and its 
volatility:  
total expenditure, transfers, subsidies, 
government investment, government con-
sumption (wage and non-wage)  
2. Government expenditure in % GDP and 
its volatility: total revenue, direct taxes, 
indirect taxes, social contributions  
 
Control variables:  
Growth model (initial GDP per capita, aver-
age total investment share of GDP, initial 
human capital, average growth rate of 
population), openness, output volatility 
(standard deviation of output business 
cycle), country dummies for Germany and 
Finland for breaks, year dummy for EMU 
and EU single market  
 
Paper looks at effects of size and volatility of gov-
ernment revenue and spending on growth. Composi-
tion of government expenditures seems to be impor-
tant, although all effects on growth are negative:  
- Indirect taxes, social contributions, and govern-
ment consumption (size and volatility);  
- Subsidies (size);  
- Government investment (volatility).  
Slightly different coefficients for EU15 and rest of 
OECD  
Kneller et 
al. 
(1999199
9) 
Following growth model litera-
ture, 22 OECD countries, 1970–
95, IMF and World Bank data, 
five year averages, two-way FE  
Log annual per 
capita GDP growth  
Policy variables: budget surplus, distortion-
ary and non-distortionary taxes, productive 
and non-productive expenditures.  
Controls: initial GDP per capita, investment, 
labour force growth, lending minus repay-
ments, other revenues  
Support for Barro (1990). Distortionary taxes reduce 
growth whereas non-distortionary taxes do not. 
Productive government expenditures stimulate 
growth, whereas non-productive expenditures do 
not.  
Romer & 
Romer 
(2010)  
‘Exogenous’ tax policy imple-
mentations using narrative re-
cords. US tax changes between 
1945-2007, quarterly data, VAR 
model  
Real GDP relative 
to normal  
VAR model with annual subsequent growth 
rates. Robustness tests involving govern-
ment spending, federal funds rates, anti-
inflationary monetary policies, monetary 
shocks 
Exogenous tax rate of 1 percent of GDP leads to 
continuous lower real GDP of 2.5-3 percent after 12 
quarterly periods.  
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